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The Failure of the Sport7 TV-channel:
Controversies in a Business Network*
Harry Sminia
Vrije Universiteit
 During 1996, TV viewers in the Netherlands witnessed the rise and fall
of Sport7: a dedicated sports TV channel. Apparently, Sport7 did not succeed to
become part of the business network of television and sports. This paper describes
and explains why the venture failed. It builds on earlier insights from research on the
outcomes of joint ventures and the business networks perspective. These insights are
combined and utilized within the framework of the theory of social becoming
(Sztompka, 1991). As such, for a new venture like Sport7, the outcome depends on
the settlement of a number of controversies that arise with the establishment of a
new actor in an existing business network. In the case of Sport7, the settlement of
these controversies appeared to go against this new venture, ultimately leading to the
demise of this new TV channel.
INTRODUCTION
In a press conference on 10 February 1996, the chairman of the Royal Dutch
Football Association (KNVB) made a statement. ‘We are going to do something
new. Something that has never been done before in the Netherlands, and maybe
in the world’.[1] He continued to explain the KNVB, with a few other investors,
was about to start a dedicated sports TV channel, which later adopted the Sport7
name. In another press conference, this time on 7 December 1996, the chairman
of the supervisory board of the Sport7 company, acting on behalf of the share-
holders, announced Sport7 was going into suspension of payment. Broadcasting
would stop the next day. Apparently, this new venture had failed.
The Sport7 case offers an outstanding opportunity to learn and expand knowl-
edge on what happens during processes like these to work towards a better under-
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standing of why a new venture fails. The literature suggests several lines of rea-
soning that can be pursued. The Sport7 venture grew out of a business consor-
tium of seven investors, and had to grow into a company in its own right. Research
on the outcome of these kinds of ventures has been limited to joint ventures
between just two partners that mostly concerned cooperation in the realm of
research and development (Ariño and de la Torre, 1998; Ariño and Doz, 2000;
Doz, 1996; Doz et al., 2000; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Zajac and Olsen, 1993).
This research put forward similar models of the cooperation process. A distinc-
tion is made between phases of initializing and negotiation, of actual interaction,
and of adaptation to changing circumstances, in some form or another. Overall,
for a joint venture to succeed, the emphasis is put on the importance of the learn-
ing process that has to take place within and around the joint venture. To Doz
(1996), this learning has a cognitive dimension (what people understand of how
the venture should be handled) and a behavioural dimension (what people can do
to better manage the venture). When learning does take place, the cooperation
process turns into a kind of positive feedback loop, amplifying initial achievement
into greater success.
Following this line of reasoning, any explanation why a new venture fails or suc-
ceeds has to start with reasons why learning had not taken place sufficiently. The
initial conditions are thought to have a heavy bearing on the outcome of a coop-
erative venture (Ariño and de la Torre, 1998; Ariño and Doz, 2000; Doz, 1996;
Doz et al., 2000). The question is whether the circumstances at the moment of
start up allow the learning process to take place. These initial conditions amount
to the definition of the task to be performed, a set of routines borrowed from each
of the partners, and the interface design between the partners and expectations
about the performance of the venture. Each of these conditions potentially either
facilitates or hampers the learning that has to take place. Additionally, a model of
relational quality has been proposed to help understand the success and failure of
joint ventures (Ariño et al., 2001). In this model, relational quality is seen as both
an input and an outcome of the alliance process. Furthermore, relational quality
is seen to depend, not only on the initial conditions, but also on the negotiation
process, partner interactions, and external events. However, much of this work,
including this model, focuses on the relationship between the joint venture part-
ners. For a new business venture to succeed, there are more relationships that need
to be changed or newly established.
Another line of reasoning stems from the business networks perspective. The
network structure, consisting of actors, activities, and resources, constitutes the
context against which a business actor has to operate (Anderson et al., 1994). Con-
sequently, for a new venture to succeed, it has to become part of the appropriate
business network. For one, this means that this new actor has to enter and main-
tain a sufficient number of meaningful relationships with other relevant actors.
These relationships predominantly are buyer/supplier relationships. And, of
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course, where there are buyer/supplier relationships, there usually are competitive
relationships as well.
Within the realm of industrial marketing, it has been realized that relationships
between buyers and suppliers can not be explained satisfactorily by the market
mechanism alone (Axelsson and Easton, 1992; Håkansson and Johanson, 1992).
Firms tend to develop more long standing and stable relationships of economic
exchange that go beyond the single transaction. Uzzi (1997) has made a distinc-
tion between ‘market relationships’ that are similar to the arms-length ties as
defined in economic reasoning, and ‘close relationships’, which are defined 
as embedded ties. An embedded tie is characterized by trust, fine grained 
information transfer, and joint problem-solving arrangements between the two
actors.
Consequently, positioning a new venture in a business network also implies that
adjustments have to be made with regard to the existing network structure. A new
actor has to join in, additional activities have to be accommodated, and the
exchange pattern and the distribution of resources have to change. There is a ques-
tion of whether these alterations are limited to incremental network change or
extend to radical network change (Halinen et al., 1999). Incremental network
change is defined as a situation of continuous movement and adjustment with
activity patterns essentially staying the same, while radical network change involves
changes with regard to the ‘deep structure’ of the network. Deep structure, in turn,
is defined as ‘the fundamental choices which sets of business actors have made
concerning who they are connected to’ (Halinen et al., 1999, p. 784). Moreover,
the degree to which change is likely, as suggested by Uzzi (1997), depends on the
number of embedded ties in the network. The more the network consists of
embedded ties instead of arms-length ties, the more difficult it becomes to change
the network structure.
This joining into an existing business network can also be looked upon as a
learning process. This can involve learning at the level of the individual tie as well
as at the level of the network as a whole (Håkansson and Johanson, 2001). Expe-
riences gained with regard to one relationship can perhaps be generalized to other
relationships, and capabilities to coordinate between different relationships can be
enhanced (Håkansson and Johanson, 2001; Pahlberg, 2001). Besides, the nature
of the learning situation is thought to depend on the type of dependency that
characterizes the resource interface of a particular relationship (Silver and Wedin,
2001). In the case of a dependent resource interface, actors are dependent on a
resource that is controlled by one particular actor in the network. Learning
amounts to adapting to this form of dependency. In the case of interdependent
resource interfaces, learning has more of mutual adaptation and exchange. Lastly,
independent resource interfaces are characterized by some form of ‘open’
standard along which interaction takes place. Learning takes on the form of
getting to know that part of the standard that applies to you.
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Taking the insights from the research into joint ventures together with the busi-
ness networks perspective, the outcome of a new venture depends upon a learn-
ing process that has to turn into a positive feedback loop that amplifies initial
achievements into durable success. The initial conditions hamper or facilitate the
start up and especially the early stages of this learning process. Furthermore, the
expectation is that a business venture only lasts if it succeeds in gaining a place in
the business network. As a consequence, on a longer time frame, the learning
process has to incorporate the establishment and maintenance of ties with a suf-
ficient number of relevant actors, with the type of resource interface indicating
what kind of learning is supposed to take place.
What needs to be investigated further, however, is the process itself. Initial con-
ditions are favourable or unfavourable to a certain degree. Learning can take off
in different directions, either acquiring knowledge about making it work or learn-
ing it cannot work. Although Ariño et al. (2001) have proposed this model of rela-
tional quality to explain the success and failure of a joint venture, knowledge about
what actually is happening during a process that results in overcoming only some
or perhaps all of the unfavourable conditions is relatively sketchy, especially with
regard to the process of securing a position in an existing business network. The
number and nature of ties a new venture needs to be able to position itself securely
in the business network can be assessed, but that still leaves us with the question
of what it takes to establish and/or change these relevant ties. It is only after ques-
tions about the what and how of the process itself are answered that questions
about the why can be further addressed.
SOCIAL BECOMING
The proposition here is to look at the process as a process of social becoming
(Sztompka, 1991). Social process is defined as potential agency that actually is
manifested in (inter)action. There are two ingredients that make this happen. On
the one hand there is social structure, which shapes and is shaped by sequences 
of manifested action. On the other hand there are actors who act within the
bounds of social structure but also find ways to defy structure. Putting this in the
vocabulary of the business networks perspective, incremental and radical network
changes (Halinen et al., 1999) are a result of a constant interplay between actors
and network structure. Incremental network change is the outcome of the process
whenever agency essentially conforms and stays within the bounds of the existing
structure. When this happens, there is continuous movement and adjustment with
activity patterns essentially staying the same. Radical network change happens
when action goes out of bounds and effectively elements of structure are changed;
consequently leading to new potential agency, with the resulting process taking 
a new turn. The learning part, then, can be taken as adjustment and adapta-
tion on the part of the actors concerned in the case of incremental change, or
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(part-)creation of new (potential) agency and elements of structure in the case of
radical change. In terms of Doz (1996), it is a matter of respectively the adjust-
ment to essentially similar patterns or the creation of new patterns of thinking
(the cognitive dimension) and acting (the behavioural dimension). It is a line of
reasoning, which closely resembles Giddens’ (1979) structuration theory.
To Sztompka, there are four levels of social structure, and each level refers to
a specific sub-process of social becoming. The ideal level concerns ‘the network of
ideas, beliefs, images, [and] convictions about reality’ (Sztompka, 1991, p. 124).
In process terms, this level concerns ‘the articulation of ideal structures (emer-
gence and change of ideas, beliefs, images and their systems)’ (Sztompka, 1991,
p. 126). This is the level where Doz (1996) has concentrated on in his research on
the outcome of joint ventures (see also Ariño and de la Torre, 1998; Ariño and
Doz, 2000; Doz et al., 2000). The learning process, as he sees it, is predominantly
aimed at arriving at a shared definition of the situation regarding the overall envi-
ronment, the tasks at hand, the process of executing these tasks, the necessary
skills, and the overall goal of the joint venture. To Anderson et al. (1994) and
Halinen et al. (1999), firms who regularly interact develop shared network per-
ceptions. This is something that has been identified by various other authors when
they investigated commonly held beliefs about the nature of a sector or industry
(e.g. Porac et al., 1989; Reger and Huff, 1993; Spender, 1989). Consequently, with
regard to this level of social structure, the outcome of a new venture can be seen
as being dependent on the establishment of a shared definition of the situation.
The normative level refers to ‘the network of rules, norms, values and institu-
tions prescribing the proper, expected conduct, and proscribing the wrong,
forbidden modes of human action’ (Sztompka, 1991, p. 124). The accompanying
process is coined in terms of ‘institutionalization of normative structures’
(Sztompka, 1991, p. 126). This level has not received very much attention when
it comes to strategic alliances and business networks. There is mentioning of ‘fair-
ness’ when it comes to sharing the proceeds of a joint venture (Doz et al., 2000).
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) have introduced the term of ‘equity’, understood as
‘fair dealing’, as one of the subjects of the learning process as well as an outcome
of a successful joint venture. In a general sense, the normative level has gained
wider recognition as a consequence of the rise of the new institutionalism
approach (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) and has been utilized in network research
(Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz, 1993). Here organizations are thought to adapt to
societal norms and values, although it has been suggested organizations actively
engage in attempts to adjust the normative level to their own standards and needs
(Oliver, 1991). Nevertheless, looking at this level of social structure, the outcome
of a new venture can be seen as being dependent on the level of compliance to
the preferred norms and values within the business network.
The third level refers to the interactional network. ‘The form, shape or geom-
etry of such interactional networks . . . significantly constrains or enables whether,
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toward whom, or with whom a person will act’ (Sztompka, 1991, p. 125). With
regard to process, this comes down to ‘the crystallization of interactional struc-
ture’ (Sztompka, 1991, p. 126). Doz (1996), concentrating on the dyadic relation-
ship of two partners in a joint venture, refers to this as the interface design. For
Uzzi (1997), this is a question of types of relationships in terms of embedded ties
or arms-length ties. In the business networks perspective, the relational level is the
point of departure for their argument. Starting with dyadic ties between business
firms, they open up the horizon by drawing attention to the whole network of rela-
tionships in trying to explain why firms act the way they do (Anderson et al., 1994).
The business network has become a research object in its own right with the recog-
nition that it can be subject to incremental or radical change (Halinen et al., 1999).
In conclusion, at this level of social structure the outcome of a new venture is
dependent on the degree to which actual interaction is possible.
The fourth level is the opportunity level. This level refers to the ‘vested inter-
ests’ and ‘variable access to valued resources or facilities’, which both constitute
the power configuration (Sztompka, 1991, p. 124). In process terms, this level is
referred to as ‘the allocation of opportunity’ (Sztompka, 1991, p. 126). Zajac and
Olsen (1993) have elaborated this level in terms of transaction costs and transac-
tion value, emphasizing that partners in a joint venture not only have an interest
in minimizing costs but also in maximizing gains. Doz (1996), in turn, talks about
the efficiency, equity and adaptability of the joint venture, when it comes to dis-
cussing what both partners get out of it. It is also one of the fundamental premises
of the business networks perspective that firms engage in relationships out of self
interest (Anderson et al., 1994). Underlying the dyadic relationships are the inter-
dependencies that have been put forward by the resource dependence perspective
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Furthermore, the type of resource interface is seen
to indicate the nature of the learning process in the case of collective innovation
in a business network (Silver and Wedin, 2001). To sum up, at the opportunity
level the outcome of a new venture is being affected by the vested interests and
resource positions of the different actors concerned.
With regards to actors, Sztompka (1991, pp. 126–7) makes a distinction between
individuals and collective agents. Individual agents can be: (type 1), ‘common
people in their normal, every day activities’; (type 2), ‘individuals who by virtue of
exceptional personal qualities . . . act as representative of others’; or (type 3), ‘those
who occupy exceptional positions, endowing them with particular prerogatives’.
Collective agents can be: (type A), ‘directed solely at the members, taken in order
to affect the members in various ways, to help, support, mould, or change them’;
(type B), ‘people get together, mobilize and act collectively to affect the wider
society’; or (type C), ‘kinds of bodies endowed with prerogatives to enact rules,
laws, binding decisions on others’.
Within the business networks perspective, the emphasis is on collective actors
(Håkansson and Johanson, 1992). The literature on joint ventures does mention
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individuals in certain instances whenever such a person plays his/her part as
member, representative or manager of a collective actor (e.g. Ariño and de la
Torre, 1998; Doz et al., 2000). The collective agents in the case of joint ventures
and business networks, of course, are firms and other organizations. Even joint
ventures can evolve into collective agents themselves when they are allowed to
develop into a separate organization.
Furthermore, an additional type of collective actor can be added, as there are
certain collections of actors that act similarly without some form of coordinated
effort. For instance, buying behaviour of groups of customers can be similar
enough to be able to make distinctions between particular markets or market seg-
ments. Also, interests of certain actors can be aligned in such a way that opposi-
tion against certain activities can follow a similar pattern, as if one is up against
a single collective actor. This ‘spontaneous collection of actors’ is taken to be a
fourth type of collective actor (type D). With regard to individual actors, type 1
refers to the persons that work at and/or are individual customers of these firms
and organizations. Some individuals in management positions are type 3 and pos-
sibly can have the personal qualities to become a type 2 individual actor.
DESCRIBING AND EXPLAINING THE SPORT7 FAILURE
There is a deliberately built-in tension or contradiction between agency and struc-
ture in the theory of social becoming (Sztompka, 1991). This theory is what Van
de Ven and Scott Poole (1995) call a dialectic process theory. On the one hand,
structure is supposed to shape the course agency takes. On the other hand, regular
patterns in agency constitute and maintain social structure and continuity, but also,
in the case of defiant behaviour, agency can be the source of change. This means
defiant behaviour potentially leads to tension, contradiction and conflict with
regard to the social structure. As a result, the definition of the situation could have
become ambiguous. The existing norms and values might have become subject to
debate. Interaction could have taken place in a way that circumvents the current
interactional network. Opportunities might have been opened up or closed down
for certain actors. Or any combination of these four possibilities could have taken
place. The moment such a controversy is resolved, either change has occurred or
the old situation has been re-established.
Adding the theory of social becoming to the deliberations allows for a further
reading of the process of a new venture trying to position itself in an existing busi-
ness network. The expectation is that controversies will arise as a consequence of
the start of a new venture. These controversies need to be settled in such a way
that it allows for the new actor to establish and maintain the ties needed to survive.
A description of the process amounts up to investigating these controversies and
telling how they are settled eventually. The four levels of social structure distin-
guished above indicate where and in what terms these controversies can occur.
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Consequently, any explanation why a new venture succeeds or fails has to con-
centrate on the reasons why the relevant controversies are settled in a particular
manner, and to what degree these settlements have contributed to the outcome of
this venture.
To do this in the Sport7 case, all the relevant actors were listed and their rela-
tionships explored. As it turned out, there were a number of different actors
present in the business network. As is shown in Table I, these could be grouped
into seven different categories. These categories are TV companies, cable com-
panies, end-users, owners/investors, sport organizations, representative organiza-
tions, and government (for a more detailed description of each of the individual
actors, see Appendix 1). The business network also contained five different types
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Table I. Relationships overview
of relationships. Obviously there are buy/sell relationships and competitive rela-
tionships present. Some actors supply goods and services to others, in the course
of which specific suppliers find they are competing against each other. Also there
were relationships of ownership, representation, and authority. The consortium
members, of course, (part-)own Sport7 but other holdings were present as well. A
few organizations acted as representative bodies for particular groups of actors
too. Finally, various government agencies oversaw the whole network, exercising
their authority when they felt appropriate. Figure 1 gives a simplified overview of
the business network.
With the start of Sport7, a number of these relationships came under pressure
or had to be newly established. Relationships that were affected were taken as a
starting point to try to see whether particular controversies could be detected. As
it turned out, a grouping could be made around three areas of contradiction.
These controversies will be described and typified below.
Controversies were looked for at each of the four levels of social structure. With
regard to the normative level, the focus was on juridical activity by one of the
actors as well as discussion over policy measures by one of the government agen-
cies. These were both taken to indicate differences with regard to the expected
normative order of things. Controversies at the ideal level were inferred from dif-
ferences in describing a particular situation by the actors concerned. The inter-
actional level was seen as being in disarray whenever the possibility for actual
interaction was being hampered or blocked. Finally, controversy at the opportu-
nity level was seen to take place whenever there was increasing rivalry, more active
competitive positioning and/or disputing over resource allocation.
Data sources that are used here include a video taped documentary on Sport7,
broadcast shortly after the Sport7 venture ended, a book analysing the Sport7
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Social Structure
Potential 
Agency
Manifested
(Inter)action
Agents
Ideal Level
Normative Level
Interactional Level
Opportunity Level
Individual Agents
Collective Agents
Figure 1. Process of social becoming
failure (De Bruin et al., 1999), and a large collection of newspaper scraps report-
ing on the Sport7 case as it unfolded during 1996.
BACKGROUND AND THREE AREAS OF CONTRADICTION
In 1995 and during the first days of 1996, with football club Ajax winning the
European Champions League and the Dutch National Side preparing for the
European Championships, football experienced a seemingly ever increasing 
popularity in the Netherlands. The contract between Dutch television and the
Royal Dutch Football Association (KNVB) over the TV rights was up for renewal.
The KNVB was expecting a record bid and had carefully designed a bidding pro-
cedure to maximize the proceeds. There were six contenders. The four commer-
cial television companies joined the Dutch Public Broadcasting System (PBS),
which traditionally had been the major sports broadcaster in the Netherlands.
Besides, this time the production rights, also traditionally in the hands of the Dutch
PBS, would be contracted out separately. Here, TV production company Endemol
was a serious contestant.
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Figure 2. Relationship overview
The first bid was expected to be handed in on 15 December 1995. In an attempt
to secure the contract, the Dutch PBS and one commercial TV company had
geared their bid and showed interest in complementary parts of the TV and pro-
duction rights, amounting up to a little over 900 million guilders[2] for the right to
produce and broadcast football for seven years. After studying the various bids, the
KNVB hinted to Dutch PBS that they should contact a second TV company to
make a final joint offer. The others seemed to be out of the race. Then came the
infamous press conference. The KNVB chairman announced that a consortium,
of which the KNVB was a member, would start a new TV channel, dedicated to
sports. This new sports channel was prepared to pay the KNVB an unprecedented
1040 million guilders for the right to produce and broadcast football for seven
years. The other contenders were baffled.
In the meantime, as it appeared, TV production company Endemol had been
able to round up a consortium of investors to back this new TV channel. Apart
from Endemol and the KNVB, these were bank and insurance company ING,
utility company Nuon, electronics company Philips, and one private investor. Part
of the shares were kept in reserve for other cable companies to join in. This stake
was thought to help persuade the other cable companies in the Netherlands to
back this venture because their cooperation was an essential part of the plan. The
idea was to have them pay 2 guilders per cable subscription per month. It was left
to the cable companies to decide whether they would raise the subscription fee for
a similar amount or find an alternative source to cover the costs. The 2 guilders
per month, together with selling advertising time and merchandizing was seen to
generate enough revenues to pay the KNVB for the TV rights and to make a
profit. In this manner, Sport7 was launched as a new actor in the business network
surrounding sports and television in the Netherlands.
With the signing of the deal between the consortium and the KNVB, not only
Sport7 as a new actor, but also three controversies were added to the business
network. Firstly, Dutch PBS were disappointed to say the least. Not only had they
lost the broadcasting rights, they had gained a competitor. They also felt they were
swindled as they thought they had reached some form of understanding with the
KNVB that their bid would be looked upon as the most favourable one, only
finding out later they had been outbid by a consortium of which the KNVB was
a member. As a consequence, Dutch PBS started to prepare themselves for some
severe rivalry and they threatened to start legal procedures.
Secondly, Sport7 still had to find a way to get their programmes to the viewer.
It was not yet clear whether the cable companies were willing to transmit the new
channel, and if they were, it was unclear under which conditions. At the time
Dutch law prohibited any TV broadcasting through the air apart from the Dutch
PBS. The plan was to charge the cable companies for transmitting the Sport7 pro-
grammes and leave them to decide whether they wanted to charge the subscribers.
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The Nuon cable company was a member of the consortium. Subscribers to this
network were going to be charged the 2 guilders per month. The consortium had
reserved part of the shares for other cable companies to join in. Nevertheless, the
other cable companies were more inclined to charge Sport7 for providing trans-
mission capacity instead of charging subscribers for additional channels. Charg-
ing TV companies had been the dominant business model in the Netherlands.
Besides, if the cable companies were thinking of charging subscribers for content,
they saw themselves more as competitors of the TV companies instead of buyers.
Thirdly, the major Dutch football clubs, and especially Feyenoord, opposed the
deal the KNVB had made with the consortium. The viability of the venture was
doubted as the Sport7 channel had not yet cleared access to the cable network.
Also the top clubs felt shortchanged as the revenues which the KNVB as a seller
to the consortium would receive, were divided up among the professional football
clubs in such a way that, if the top clubs had sold the broadcasting rights of their
games themselves, they felt they would have received more money. So here was a
controversy within the ranks of the KNVB as a representative of the football clubs
in the Netherlands, with Feyenoord insisting the KNVB did not have the right to
sell TV rights on behalf of the Dutch professional football clubs; Feyenoord too
was contemplating starting legal procedures.
These three controversies constitute the initial conditions at the start of the
Sport7 venture. For Sport7 to succeed, these controversies needed to be settled in
a particular manner. Sport7 had to conquer a viable competitive position next to
the other TV channels, and especially Dutch PBS. Sport7 had to link up with the
cable companies to secure access to the viewers under conditions that would make
Sport7 profitable. Finally, the KNVB had to have the right to sell the TV rights
on behalf of the Dutch professional football clubs reconfirmed, otherwise Sport7
would loose its major asset. Each of the three controversies will be discussed 
below. Table II lists the major events on a time axis and links these to the three
controversies.
FIRST CONTROVERSY: SPORT7 VERSUS PBS
The PBS people were outraged when the KNVB chairman announced the TV
rights would be sold to a dedicated sports channel, of which the KNVB was part-
owner as well. The PBS channels had much at stake. Football on television mostly
produces good viewing rates. Also their production facilities would become redun-
dant. They felt cheated, and as a reaction they almost immediately announced
that they were starting legal procedures because they suspected this deal was
against the rules of fair competition.
The Minister of Culture was worried as well.[3] Firstly, if TV coverage of Dutch
football moved from the PBS channels to Sport7 completely, a number of people
would not be able to watch football on TV because they did not have a cable 
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Table II. List of major events
15 December 1995 * * * Deadline first bidding
10 February 1996 * * * KNVB press conference announcing sports TV channel
12 February 1996 * VECAI chairman doubts willingness cable companies to 
cooperate
12 February 1996 * PBS start legal procedures
12 February 1996 * Feyenoord votes against Sport7 deal in KNVB meeting
13 February 1996 * VECAI speaks against Sport7 conditions for transmission
19 February 1996 * Statement from Minister of Culture on sub-licensing PBS
21 February 1996 * Dutch government lays out requirements for basic
package calbe transmission
24 February 1996 * Feyenoord makes KNVB ultimatum
27 February 1996 * KNVB does not answer ultimatum
4 March 1996 * PBS and Sport7 start negotiations on sub-licensing
8 March 1996 * KNVB and Feyenoord meet in court
15 March 1996 * Cable company A2000 willing to transmit Sport7 as part
of an additional package
20 March 1996 * Verdict first court case: Feyenoord has to conform to
KNVB policies
3 April 1996 * Sport7 announces free transmission for first three weeks
3 April 1996 Negotiations started between Sport7 and individual cable
companies
1 June 1996 * EC Commissioner Karel van Miert announces
investigation
7 June 1996 * Cable company Casema willing to transmit Sport7 for
free for first three weeks
19 June 1996 * Cable company Castel and Sport7 agree on conditions
for transmission
22 June 1996 * PBS and Sport7 make deal on sub-licensing
3 August 1996 * VECAI advises members to transmit Sport7 for free for
first three weeks
18 August 1996 * Sport7 starts broadcasting
1 October 1996 * A2000 puts Sport7 behind decoder as part of an
additional package
23 October 1996 * KNVB and Feyenoord meet in court of appeal
24 October 1996 * Provisional ruling second court case: Feyenoord wins
28 October 1996 * Sport7 extends free period to 1 January
29 October 1996 * Cable company Eneco stops transmitting Sport7
1 November 1996 * Casema stops transmitting Sport7
9 November 1996 * Feyenoord bans Sport7 cameras from own grounds
18 November 1996 * KNVB proposition to change the bylaws; voting likens to
go against KNVB
21 November 1996 * KNVB board threatens to step down
7 December 1996 * * Sport7 Supervisory Board decides to stop
8 December 1996 * * Sport7 stops broadcasting
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connection. Secondly, those who did have a cable connection were probably going
to face an additional charge of 2 guilders per month. The Minister felt he had to
safeguard a fair level of adequate sports information for all people at minimum
cost. Thirdly, there was the issue of free collection of news. A journalist has a right
to cover news events, and this might be at odds with the intention of restricting
media access to football games. The Media Act gives the PBS channels a right to
broadcast news and information on issues of national interests. Major sports events
(football matches are considered major sports events) count as an issue of national
interest. Fourthly, he also recognized there was a possibility of the KNVB and the
cable companies joining together to monopolize football coverage on TV, which
would be against national and European rules of fair competition. The Minister
indicated that the chances of him stepping in depended on Sport7’s willingness to
sub-license some of the TV rights to the PBS channels. With regard to the fourth
point, Euro Commissioner Karel van Miert announced he was going to investi-
gate the Sport7 deal as there was a suspicion it violated European regulations. His
ruling would also depend on the amount of sub-licensing.
The PBS channels and Sport7 started negotiations on mutual sub-licensing.
Sport7 of course had bought the TV rights for football, but they also wanted to
fill 75 per cent of their broadcasting time with other sports. The PBS channels
possessed the TV rights of a number of other sports events, and Sport7 had inter-
est in PBS’s enormous archive of historical footage. Meanwhile, to bolster their
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Figure 3. Sport7 vs. PBS
positions, both parties tried to secure the TV rights of additional sports as well.
The PBS channels closed deals with a number of smaller sports associations.
Sport7 also acquired TV rights of a number of foreign sports events. On 22 June,
both parties came to an agreement, settling who could broadcast what at which
time.
The PBS channels also decided to compete with Sport7 head on. After Sport7
had started broadcasting, the PBS channels increased the amount of sports 
coverage as well. They also started a publicity campaign to acquire the viewing
public’s sympathy. Their most popular sports programme, Studio Sport, was accom-
panied by a trailer with the slogan ‘of everyone – for everyone’.[4] This was an
attempt to foster a hostile attitude against Sport7 because a large number of
viewers felt football had been taken away from them. This slogan amplified a
feeling among viewers that Sport7 wanted to charge 2 guilders per household for
sports coverage on TV that previously had been provided for free. The initiators
of Sport7, on the other hand, explained that their way of exploiting these TV
rights was the only safeguard for keeping football on TV in Dutch hands and
offered at a reasonable price because they forecast that these rights eventually
would end up in the hands of a global media conglomerate with viewers having
to pay much more than 2 guilders per month for watching football on TV.
Besides, Sport7 boasted that their programmes were going to be innovative and
better than anything the PBS channels had ever done before. This latter claim,
however, turned against them because most viewers refused to agree, and the
notion of ‘Sport7 quality’ acquired an ironic ring to it. As a consequence, the
Sport7 viewing rates were much lower than expected, which of course affected
advertising revenues. By October, KNVB and Sport7 officials were saying that
Sport7 sports coverage was not as good as initially was hoped for, but this was due
to start up problems which would be ironed out in the near future. Also one wanted
to renegotiate the sub-licensing deal with the PBS channels because Sport7 had
apparently been to generous; allowing the PBS channels to compete at this level.
It never came to that. On 7 December the supervisory board of Sport7 pulled the
plug. Sport7 would stop broadcasting the next day.
At the opportunity level, the sub-licensing deal eventually defined part of the
competitive relationship between Dutch PBS and Sport7. The controversy was
settled in terms of regulating mutual access to the resources relating to their broad-
casting materials. Additionally, at the normative level the same deal reconfirmed
the special position of Dutch PBS in the Netherlands as the deal was prompted
by the Minister for Culture who actively enforced the Media Act. Besides, the
European Commission was monitoring the situation for possible breaches of the
rules on fair competition. Furthermore, with regard to their mutual competitive
position in terms of viewing audiences, the tip of the scale balanced towards Dutch
PBS, aided by a hostile attitude among Dutch viewers towards Sport7 and the
failure of Sport7 to deliver the high quality programming that was promised.
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Apparently, Sport7 had violated a norm held by the Dutch viewing public that
football coverage on TV should be part of the public domain. This left Sport7
holding on to the short end of the stick; contemplating ways of opening up the
negotiations once more, when the venture was being ended.
SECOND CONTROVERSY: SPORT7 VERSUS CABLE COMPANIES
The Sport7 venture counted on two main sources for revenues. According to the
business plan, the biggest source was advertising.[5] Next came the 2 guilders per
month, which the cable companies had to pay for every connection. The con-
sortium was confident that the cable companies would not hesitate to pay these 2
guilders, hinting that the cable companies could raise the subscription fee for a
similar amount. They even reserved 15 per cent of the shares in the new company
for cable companies to pick up, so they could benefit from the venture as well. The
Nuon cable company was already one of the shareholders, and the expectation
was that the other cable companies willingly would join in.
Nevertheless, in an initial reaction on 12 February, the chairman of the associ-
ation for cable companies in the Netherlands (VECAI) doubted whether the cable
companies would join in.[6] In their view, there were three types of TV channels.
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Figure 4. Sport7 vs. cable companies
Firstly, there were PBS channels which were transmitted at cost, paid for by the
subscription fee. Secondly, there were open commercial channels that paid the
cable companies for transmission. Thirdly, there were pay channels for which 
the viewer had to have an additional subscription and a decoder to be able to
watch. These pay channels also had to pay the cable companies for transmission.
This definition of the situation was about to change a little, prompted by possible
new legislation. The Dutch government was working on a revision of the Media
Act. They were thinking of defining a basic package, consisting of a number of
TV channels that were considered essential for the Dutch viewer to be able to
watch. This basic package was expected to be transmitted by the cable companies
at cost. That would open up the possibility for the cable companies to offer addi-
tional packages to their subscribers at extra charge. The VECAI chairman spec-
ulated, following the logic of the cable companies, that Sport7 had a choice. They
could become an open commercial channel that paid the cable companies for
transmission. Or, if they wanted to have 2 guilders per subscription per month,
they should become a pay channel and charge the cable subscribers directly, while
still paying the cable companies for transmission. In the near future, there was a
possibility for Sport7 to become part of some additional package under terms that
had to be negotiated.
Indeed, the VECAI board spoke against paying the 2 guilders per month for
every cable connection the next day. Some of the cable companies declared that
they were willing to negotiate on the terms of transmitting Sport7 as part of a
possible future additional package. The cable companies very much feared that if
they became part of a commercial TV channel and collected money on behalf of
that channel, other commercial TV channels might start asking for money as well.
The cable companies preferred it the other way round. The government spoke
out on the matter soon after that on 21 February. They wanted the Dutch and
foreign PBS channels to become part of a legally required basic package. What
happened to the commercial channels was a matter that had to be decided in con-
sultation by the cable companies themselves and local government, which often
still had a say in what was going to be transmitted. Basically, commercial TV 
channels would be faced with the choice described above. However, the actual
introduction of additional packages would have to wait until sufficient decoders
would become available in the Netherlands. Besides, only 30 per cent of the cable
connections were capable of supporting a decoder. The expectation was that it
would take some time before the cable network was technically ready.
This attitude of the cable companies was a severe setback for Sport7. Either
they paid the cable companies for transmission instead of the cable companies
paying them 2 guilders per month for every cable connection, or they became a
pay channel or part of an additional package – but that would very likely decrease
the number of subscribers. Research by the University of Amsterdam indicated
that 80 per cent of the viewers were not prepared to pay for a decoder to receive
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Sport7.[7] Only Nuon was willing to collect the 2 guilders per connection per
month, but this company was owned by a member of the consortium.
Sport7 had planned to start broadcasting on 18 August. On 3 April, Sport7
announced that they would allow transmission for free for the first three weeks.
They started negotiations with individual cable companies to see whether they
would take up the offer. In the meantime, one cable company stated that they were
ready for introducing additional packages. Commercial TV channels could be
added to the basic package if they were willing to pay the right price. Two other
cable companies agreed to transmit Sport7 for free while waiting for further devel-
opments. Finally, on 3 August, the VECAI agreed to advise all other cable com-
panies to transmit the programme for free until sufficient decoders became
available. As it appeared, almost every cable subscriber would be able to watch
Sport7’s first broadcast on 18 August.
On 28 October, Sport7 announced it would extend the free period until 1
January. Nevertheless, one cable company had put Sport7 behind a decoder in an
additional package from 1 October onwards.[8] Other cable companies stopped
transmitting Sport7 at all, as they felt they could utilize their limited transmission
capacity better. This meant that a decreasing percentage of the cable subscribers
had the ability to watch Sport7 for free, if at all. On 7 December, the supervisory
board of Sport7 pulled the plug. Sport7 would stop broadcasting the next day.
Again this was a controversy that was characterized by negotiations, but this
time these were more haphazard. The conflict hinged on the ideal level, as both
Sport7 and the cable companies had different definitions of the situation. They
both went into the negotiations as sellers. Sport7 tried to sell TV content while the
cable companies were in the business of selling transmission capacity. In the mean-
time at the normative level, the Dutch government was working on changes in the
Media Act that would alter the circumstances under which cable transmission was
going to take place. By allowing the introduction of additional packages, in turn,
the cable companies were given the upper hand with regard to the opportunity
level, as effectively they could decide which channel was going to be transmitted
under what conditions.
For Sport7, the only way around this was a sort of popular demand in case
viewers insisted a particular commercial TV channel had to be transmitted regard-
less. Judging by the popularity of Sport7 with the Dutch viewers, as has been put
forward above, this was unlikely to happen in the short run. Besides, at the inter-
actional level there were technical limitations that also affected possibilities for
interaction between TV companies and their viewers through cable networks.
Eventually, back at the ideal level, the definition of the situation in which the cable
companies were the sellers and the TV companies were the buyers acquired domi-
nance and Sport7 had to give in. With regard to this point, Sport7 were forced 
to learn the hard way about the appropriate definition of the situation, and the
interests they were up against. Sport7 ran into barriers that were present at the
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ideal and opportunity levels. The cable companies had defined their interests in
terms of protecting and expanding their position as sellers of transmission 
capacity in the business network. Aided by developments at the normative and
interactional levels, they were able to strengthen that position at the expense of
Sport7.
THIRD CONTROVERSY: KNVB VERSUS FEYENOORD
Almost immediately after the press conference on 12 February, in which the KNVB
announced the establishment of a new TV sports channel, it appeared that the
Ajax and Feyenoord football clubs were against the deal. Later that month, in a
KNVB meeting, during which the clubs had to approve the deal, four football
clubs including Feyenoord did not vote in favour. They doubted the financial base
of the new venture, especially as it appeared to them that Sport7 would probably
disappear behind a decoder, limiting the viewing potential considerably, and nega-
tively affecting revenues from both advertising and viewers. Besides, although the
deal was approved in that meeting on a majority vote, the Feyenoord chairman
doubted whether the KNVB actually had the power to sell the TV rights. He
believed that the clubs own the TV rights, and Feyenoord had never given the
KNVB permission to sell the TV rights on their behalf.
Immediately after the meeting, Feyenoord contemplated starting legal pro-
cedures against the KNVB to try to clarify who actually had the power to sell the
TV rights. Although the deal brought an unprecedented amount of money in the
hands of the football clubs, the top clubs in the Dutch league felt shortchanged.
In their view they subsidized the lesser clubs because they attracted larger crowds
and more viewers, and this was only partly reflected in the distribution code. The
top clubs did subscribe to a form of solidarity among all the professional football
clubs in the Dutch league, but discussion remained on how much this principle
should cost them. Besides, the top clubs expected that there were even more and
bigger deals to be done in the near future on a larger European scale, and they
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did not want to have their hands tightened too much. The KNVB on the other
hand, and also the majority of the clubs, thought the Sport7 deal was the best
they could get. Especially as the KNVB was part of the consortium as well, they
felt more in control because they were able to directly influence how football was
treated on television.
Feyenoord in fact proceeded and gave the KNVB an ultimatum. Feyenoord
announced they were going to start summary proceedings against the KNVB,
unless the KNVB would make a statement before 27 February, 12:00 noon, declar-
ing that the TV rights of Feyenoord’s home games were owned by Feyenoord.
Sixteen other clubs in the Dutch league appealed to Feyenoord in an open 
letter to stop resisting the deal. The KNVB did not answer the ultimatum, and
Feyenoord and the KNVB met in court on 8 March. The verdict came 12 days
later on 20 March. In the meantime, the other two top clubs had joined Feyeno-
ord, telling the KNVB in writing that they wanted to sell their TV rights them-
selves. The judge ruled in a temporary injunction for Feyenoord to conform to
KNVB policy because Feyenoord is a member of the association, and therefore
has to submit to it.
The Feyenoord chairman did not feel defeated and announced he would now
embark on full legal action. Not only did he announce that he would appeal against
this verdict, he also said he wanted to file a complaint against the KNVB with the
Ministry of Economic Affairs and the EC because of what he felt was cartel-like
behaviour on the part of the KNVB. He simply wanted to defend his rights and
to know where Feyenoord stood in this matter, he declared.[9] The appeal finally
appeared in court as late as 23 October. In the meantime, Sport7 had started
broadcasting. A provisional judgement was made the following day. The judge
ruled that Feyenoord had the right to prohibit cameras to record home games.
Because of the complexity of the matter, a final judgement was postponed until 8
November. That day, the judge only made another provisional judgement, this
time adding that, according to the KNVB bylaws, the home side has the right 
to prohibit live broadcasts of their games. The final judgement was now expected
on 20 December. The judge did appeal to both Feyenoord and the KNVB to try
to settle the conflict out of court before that date.
The fact that home sides had the power to prohibit live broadcasts of their
games meant that the KNVB could not keep to the terms of the contract with
Sport7. Realizing the devastating potential to the whole venture, the KNVB imme-
diately scheduled a meeting to discuss a proposal to change the bylaws with regard
to this matter. Feyenoord exercised their rights and forbade a live broadcast of the
next home game. Ironically, Sport7 had sold this game to one of the TV pay 
channels. The latter immediately claimed compensation for Sport7 failing to
deliver. At the KNVB meeting on 18 November, the actual proposition was put to
the members. Voting on the change of the bylaws was scheduled for the meeting
on 8 December. On 21 November, in a letter to the members, the KNVB execu-
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tive board threatened to step down if the proposed changes in the bylaws were
not approved. This time not only did the professional football clubs have to vote
in favour, but also the amateur part of the KNVB. The board needed a two thirds
majority to succeed. In the meantime, Sport7 threatened to sue for compensation
if the KNVB failed to keep to the terms of the contract. Feyenoord and the KNVB
were unable to compromise. By 5 December, the amateur part of the KNVB
appeared to be mostly against the proposition. On 7 December, the supervisory
board of Sport7 pulled the plug. Sport7 would stop broadcasting the next day. The
KNVB executive board stepped down the same day.
Interestingly, this is a controversy that only indirectly affected Sport7, as it mostly
concerned the KNVB, who was one of the consortium members as well as the
main supplier of TV rights. Nevertheless, the way this controversy was develop-
ing did help to bring down the Sport7 venture. It started at the opportunity level
as a conflict of interests between the KNVB and the top clubs, with Feyenoord
leading the battle. It quickly spread to the normative level when the right to sell
TV rights by the KNVB was being disputed and legal procedures were started.
This in turn affected the interactional level in two ways. Firstly, the buyer–supplier
relationship between the KNVB and Sport7 became unsettled, as it was starting
to look like the KNVB had nothing to sell. Secondly, the representative relation-
ship between the KNVB and the football clubs was in disarray as the clubs lost
confidence in the KNVB and especially the executive board as their representa-
tive body. The controversy was not completely settled before the Sport7 supervi-
sory board decided to put an end to the Sport7 venture. What had happened was
that the KNVB ceased to be an effective actor as they were in the process of losing
their most valuable resource, viz. the TV rights, and their mandate to act on behalf
of the clubs they represented. With this hanging over their head, the Sport7
resource position, in turn, was in jeopardy indeed.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The combined effect of the three controversies described above made the con-
sortium members loose faith in the viability of the Sport7 venture. The unwill-
ingness of the cable companies to cooperate deteriorated the earning potential of
Sport7 considerably. It turned out that Sport7 was unable to collect the 2 guilders
per cable connection per month. At most, there was a possibility that Sport7 could
collect a small fee per connection, but only from those cable subscribers that opted
for an additional package. At worst, Sport7 had to pay the cable companies for
transmission instead of being paid for offering a programme. Besides, the com-
petition between Sport7 and the PBS channels had a devastating effect on Sport7’s
popularity. This affected the viewing rates, which in turn had consequences for
Sport7’s position in the advertising market and the willingness of viewers to pay
an additional charge for receiving the sports channel. Finally, when it appeared
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the agreement between the KNVB and Sport7 was based on legal quicksand, as
the Feyenoord versus KNVB court case would show, the decision to stop was
readily made. Looking at the three controversies separately, two of the three ended
up in a settlement that was unfavourable for Sport7, while the third one seemed
to go against Sport7 when the venture was being ended. It is the way in 
which these controversies were settled that explains the outcome of the Sport7
venture.
The three controversies have been analysed here as separate processes. However,
mutual influences are traceable in the course of events, leading to an image of
‘interacting vicious circles’ denying Sport7 its existence. The problems Sport7
encountered in accessing the viewers through the cable network and the initial
outcome of the competitive battle between PBS and Sport7 strengthened 
Feyenoord’s conviction that Sport7 was not going to be a viable business, thereby
fuelling the club’s determination to oppose the KNVB and gaining support among
other KNVB members. Besides, the bad image of Sport7 among the Dutch
viewers was partly prompted by the 2 guilders per connection per month that
Sport7 wanted from the cable companies. This, the Dutch viewers felt, was a ploy
to eventually charge them for something they always had had for free. It weak-
ened the competitive position of Sport7 in relation to Dutch PBS by affecting the
viewing rates, and bolstered the position of the cable companies as there was little
fear of a popular demand for the transmission of Sport7.
Both the research into joint ventures and the business network perspective have
captured the process in terms of learning. To the joint venture researchers, the
initial conditions, as well as the other three elements of relational quality hamper
or facilitate the process (Ariño and de la Torre, 1998; Ariño and Doz, 2000; Ariño
et al., 2001; Doz, 1996; Doz et al., 2000). When learning does take place, the co-
operation process turns into a kind of positive feedback loop, amplifying initial
achievement into greater success. Taking the theory of social becoming as a point
of reference, the joint venture research has put the emphasis on the ideal level of
social structure. Here the interactional, normative and opportunity levels have
been added, allowing for a process analysis that looks at learning not only as arriv-
ing at a shared definition of the situation, but also as agreeing on acceptable norms
and values, as opening up interaction possibilities, and as compromising with
regard to differences in opportunities and interests as well. The Sport7 joint
venture partners have indeed acknowledged that learning at all these levels 
had taken place, only it was not the type of learning that comes with the above
mentioned positive feedback loop. They learned that Dutch PBS could not be 
circumvented and they had to accept a sub-licensing deal that eroded their
resource position substantially.[10] They learned that their original proposal to gain
access to the cable network was not going to be accepted, so they had to make
adjustments.[11] Finally, they learned about the fragility of their resource position
when the KNVB started to crumble under the opposition from the clubs.[12]
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Looking at learning from a business network perspective point of view, the Sport7
case highlights another interesting phenomenon. It seems that the KNVB, with the
other partners in the Sport7 venture took the business network as being character-
ized by ‘dependent resource interfaces’, with the TV rights being the essential
resource here (Silver and Wedin, 2001). On this basis, Sport7 was introduced by
them as the central actor; expecting the others to enter a learning process of adap-
tation to their mode of operation. However, most of these other actors entered the
process more with an ‘interdependent resource interfaces’ frame of mind. As it
appeared, Sport7 themselves were forced to learn by way of adjustment and adap-
tation; eventually finding it impossible to sustain a viable position in the network. It
is by adding the theory of social becoming that an analysis of how one learning
mode gains dominance over another can be made. It is by looking for the contro-
versies and describing their settlement that an explanation can be found.
In essence, this paper is an experiment of thought. It is an attempt to describe
and explain the failure of the Sport7 TV channel. The possible wider significance
concerns the theoretical line of thought, which has been developed here. Its use-
fulness has been demonstrated here in explaining the Sport7 failure, which in turn
allows for some generalization to the theoretical propositions put forward in this
paper (Yin, 1989). This line of thought might also inform further research into the
outcome of business ventures. As Doz (1996) concluded, the strategy process is
neither static or dynamic, nor teleological or emergent, but is better seen as self-
adjusting and adaptive. Looking at it as a process of continuity and change in
terms of the development and settlement of particular controversies, might be a
fruitful option. In this case, it did lead to a description and explanation of how
and in what way the Sport7 venture failed. However, the actual reasons why Sport7
failed are found in the particularities within the case. Following the theoretical line
of thought that has been put forward here, the why with regard to the outcome
of new ventures can be further addressed. Research, then, should probe into more
general reasons why controversies are settled in a particular manner.
Building on this line of thought, one issue that could be investigated further con-
cerns the question why some controversies lead more to a situation of winners and
losers, as was the case with the three controversies here, while other controversies
lead more to compromises with each actor involved getting something out of it.
Work has already been done that focused on the particular negotiating strategies
that can be employed (e.g. Axelrod, 1990; Bazerman and Neale, 1992; Fisher et al.,
1990). Looking at the Sport7 case, the outcome might have something to do with
the ‘depth’ of the controversy. Although to Sztompka (1991), all four levels of social
structure are equivalent, some form of hierarchy could exist here. In those instances
in which a controversy only concerns the opportunity level, the actors involved can
more easily reach a compromise. Whenever the controversy deepens to the other
levels of social structure, as was the case here, it seems that the conflict hardens, and
it can only be resolved if one side is able to overpower the other side. A conflict of
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interests normally occurs between two actors in a network. To settle this type of con-
flict, only some mutual adjustment is required, or as Lundgren (1992) put it: a
process of coordination leading to incremental change. When the conflict deepens
to other levels of social structure, more actors in the network need to be mobilized,
possibly leading to a more radical change (Halinen et al., 1999; Lundgren, 1992),
but also leading to settlements with clear winners and losers.
Another question arising out of this analysis has to do with the ‘width’ of the
changes that were needed for Sport7 to succeed. For one, the mobilization of more
actors as a consequence of the ‘depth’ of a controversy might stir a number of
other potential controversies to come to the surface. Besides, as for the learning
experience, Sport7 suffered setback upon setback, but there were no less than three
controversies that had to be settled. For the Sport7 supervisory board, it was not
only the succession of setback upon setback, but also the fact that there were three
controversies that had to be settled, which made them lose faith. Besides, as was
explained above, these three controversies also had a bearing on each other. It still
remains a question whether each of these controversies on its own could have
brought down Sport7, or if it was the combination of the three that made it a
failure. Taking this image of ‘interacting vicious circles’ mentioned above, a com-
bination of unfavourable settlements might have a disproportionally larger nega-
tive effect on the outcome of a new venture than just one unfavourable settlement
on its own. Again this requires further research.
To sum up, any new venture will give cause for conflict or contradiction in the
business network. How these controversies are settled determines the outcome of
a new venture. In the case of Sport7, the settlement of the three controversies
appeared to go against it. With regard to the settlement of controversies in general,
some interesting questions can be put forward. What will be the effect of ‘depth’,
of having to reach compromises at the opportunity level only, or are the other
three levels of social structure going to be involved as well? Or will it be a ques-
tion of ‘width’, of having to work your way through to many controversies that
explains the outcome in cases like these? Or will it be a combination of the two?
These are questions that can be further investigated. What can be concluded at
this point, however, has to do with planning new ventures like the Sport7 TV
channel. For judging the chances of a successful outcome, it seems fruitful to try
to assess the number and nature of the controversies that probably will arise as a
consequence of the attempt to gain a place in the business network. By doing this,
the initiators at least know what they are up against.
NOTES
*I wish to thank the five anonymous reviewers of the Journal of Management Studies for their comments
on earlier versions of this article. The first version of this article was presented to the Sub-theme on
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[1] Translated from KNVB press conference, as repeated in PBS TV programme Reporter.
[2] f 2.20371 = €1.00.
[3] Based on a letter to parliament by the Minister for Culture, dated 2 February 1996.
[4] Translated from Dutch.
[5] De Bruin et al. (1999, p. 34).
[6] The shares that initially were reserved for the cable companies were later picked up by the 
privatized Dutch mail and telecommunications company KPN. The private investor sold his
shares on to newspaper publisher De Telegraaf.
[7] De Telegraaf, 7 March 1996.
[8] Much to their dismay, Sport7 was put in an additional package with an adult channel and a
Chinese comedy channel.
[9] De Telegraaf, 27 February 1996.
[10] This was stated by Henk Kivits, chief executive of Sport7 (NRC Handelsblad, 9 December 1996),
John de Mol, chief executive of Endemol (NRC Handelsblad, 17 December 1996), and Peter
Vogelzang, chief executive of the KNVB (NRC Handelsblad, 27 December 1996).
[11] Later Jos Staatsen, chairman of the KNVB (De Telegraaf, 27 December 1996), as well as Peter
Vogelenzang, chief executive of the KNVB (NRC Handelsblad, 27 December 1996) considered
this a severe setback. John de Mol, chief executive of Endemol (NRC Handelsblad, 17 Decem-
ber 1996) and Henk Kivits, chief executive of Sport7 (NRC Handelsblad, 9 December 1996)
treated this more as a hurdle, which after it emerged could not be taken, had to be 
circumvented.
[12] John de Mol, chief executive of Endemol (NRC Handelsblad, 17 December 1996) described the
demise of the KNVB in this matter as having the effect of the disappearance of the light at
the end of the tunnel.
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Overview of actors
TV companies Public Broadcasting System (three channels)
The number of Dutch TV channels has grown HMG (RTL4, RTL5, Veronica)
substantially during the past few years. Wegener Arcade (TV10, TMF)
Originally, there only was a public broadcasting SBS6
system. This has been supplemented with a Filmnet/Supersport pay channels
number of commercial operators. Teleselect pay channel
Cable companies Nuon operates a cable network in the East and
The three PBS channels are broadcast through the North of the Netherlands.
a number of VHF/UHF transmitters. All the A2000 operates a network in the Amsterdam
other TV channels can only be received area.
through cable. In the early days, every Casema operates a network in the West of the
household had its own antenna on the roof Netherlands.
and was able to receive these three channels. Combivisie Regio operates a network in the South
During the 1970s and 1980s, municipalities of the Netherlands.
adopted a policy against roof antennae and Castel operates a network in the Northeast of
started to construct cable networks. In this way, the Netherlands.
a large number of cable companies were Eneco operates a network in the Rotterdam
established which were local government area.
owned. These were later sold off, and in 1996,
most of these local cable networks were linked
up and owned by a regional operator. The 15
largest cable companies in 1996 had a market
share of 76.1%.1
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End-users Dutch viewers The biggest group are those 
viewers who have a cable 
subscription and enjoy an
offering of on average 27
channels.
A smaller group, mostly living 
in remote areas, has to rely on 
their own antennae. These 
viewers are able to receive the 
three Dutch PBS channels, and 
the Flemish and German PBS 
channels, depending on which 
part of the country they live in.
Some of these viewers have
bought their own satellite dish 
and receiver, but this is not a 
very widespread phenomenon.
There are viewers who enjoy 
visiting sports events as well. So 
the group of viewers contains a 
subgroup of sports fans that visit
sports events.
Advertisers
Both the PBS channels and the commercial 
channels sell advertising slots between the 
programmes. So they compete for the same
advertising guilders.
Owners/investors Endemol used to have a share in HMG (owner 
In 1996, there were a number of companies of TV channels RTL4, RTL5, and 
who had reasons to invest in TV companies Veronica).
and/or cable companies. A number of them ING was a major sponsor of the KNVB.
had commercial interests in football clubs as KPN sponsered the KNVB as well, and has
well. The consortium of investors in Sport7 entered a joint venture with Philips 
initially consisted of the Royal Dutch Football (Teleselect).
Association (KNVB), television production Nuon was a privatized electricity company,
company Endemol, bank and insurance which had branched out in other utilities 
company ING, cable company Nuon Telekabel, and also sponsered the football clubs Vitesse 
electronics company Philips, and one private and Heerenveen.
investor. The private investor sold his share to Philips also had entered joint ventures with US
publisher Telegraaf in early April, while the West (this joint venture owns the cable 
share which was reserved for other cable companies A2000 and Combivisie Regio),
companies was picked up by the privatized and KPN (the pay TV channel Teleselect).
Dutch mail and telecom company KPN. Besides, Philips is associated with football 
club PSV.
Newspaper publisher Telegraaf also was part
owner of TV channel SBS6.
Publisher VNU had a stake in HMG.
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Publisher/record company Wegener-Arcade
owned TV channels TV10 and TMF.
Nethold owned the pay TV channels Filmnet 
and Supersport.2
Sport organizations Dutch professional football clubs are of course 
the first that spring to mind. They compete in 
two national leagues. The top league consists of
18 clubs and the winner is the Dutch football 
champion. The second league consists of 18
clubs as well. Besides, there is a national cup
that works with a knock out system in which all
the professional clubs compete together with 
the national amateur football champions. The 
major contenders for national championship 
and the national cup are Ajax, Feyenoord, and
PSV.
Because Sport7’s ambition was to become a 
dedicated sports channel and not a football 
channel exclusively, other sports organizations are 
important as well. These are the equivalents of
the football clubs but in other sports. Also,
there are a number of organizers of special 
sports events, ranging, for instance, from the
organizers of the annual Rotterdam Marathon
to the Olympic Games. These all provide 
material to broadcast and have TV rights to sell.
Interest groups There is the Royal Dutch Football Association
(KNVB). They organize the football competition
in the Netherlands, both the professional and 
amateur leagues, and they represent the 
interests of football in general and among 
other things, the interests of professional 
football clubs in particular with regard to
various matters.
There is the Association of Cable Companies 
in the Netherlands (VECAI ). They have a 
representative role when it comes to protecting 
the interests of cable companies in the
Netherlands. Apart from a few small
companies who are still in the hands of local
government, most cable companies enjoy
membership.
There are a large number of sports associations
in the Netherlands, which fulfil the same 
function as the KNVB. Those representing 
major sports in the Netherlands like tennis,
speed skating and cycling mind their own
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affairs. The smaller sports associations mostly
are represented by the Dutch sports federation
NOC*NSF.
Government There is a Media Act, which falls under the
Various levels of government are actors in responsibility of the Minister for Culture. The 
the network. Media Act regulates both TV companies as 
well as cable companies.
Anti-trust matters and issues of fair competition
fall under the Minister of Economic Affairs.
Besides, most municipalities might have sold off
their cable companies, but they still largely
determine in one way or the other which TV
channels are passed through to the cable
subscribers. The idea is that in this way the
cable subscribers, who are also voting
residents in a municipality, can have a say in 
what they receive and pay for.
Overseeing all this is the European Community.
They too hold a watchful eye over anti-trust 
matters and issues of fair competition (for
instance, because of an EC ruling Endemol
had to sell its share in HMG).
1 Source: http://www.vecai.nl/facts.htm
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